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BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS - Staying Afloat With a Hole in the
Wyoming LLC Act: Default Rules in a Contractual LLC World. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004).
INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 2004, more domestic limited liability companies than
corporations were once again registered in Wyoming.' While glaringly little
case law exists to elucidate the language used in the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act ("WLLCA"), its pronounced ability to allow an investor to protect his or her personal assets from risks taken by the business venture while retaining control over his or her investments appears to have created enormous confidence in the limited liability company ("LLC") structure.' Not only does this characteristic encourage the formation of LLCs, it
also lowers investors' thresholds for assuming risky behavior.3 While the
WLLCA may thereby encourage entrepreneurship and bring business to
Wyoming, state lawyers should keep in mind this business entity is no panacea.' Default rules exist should gaps occur in LLC operating agreements and
articles of organization whether client names have been merely cut and
pasted into a borrowed form or time has been taken to create a unique contract.5 When a gap in LLC documents and the pertinent state statutes occurs,
an investor's increased propensity to take on risk coupled with a lack of established default rules could result in both an unpredictable and ruinous outcome.6 The experience of E. Michael Lieberman is both an advisory and
cautionary tale.
In September of 1994, Wyoming.com LLC ("Wyoming.com"), an
internet service provider, was formed with capital contributions valued at
1.

WYOMING

SECRETARY

OF

STATE

OFFICE,

CORPORATIONS

DIVISION-NEw

(2004), at http://soswy.state.wy.us/corporat/m-stats/fy0304nr.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2004). In Wyoming fiscal year 2003 (which runs from July 1, 2002 to
June 30, 2003), 1,977 Wyoming profit corporations and 2,630 Wyoming limited liability
companies were registered with the Wyoming Secretary of State. Id. In fiscal year 2004,
2,937 Wyoming profit corporations and 3,682 Wyoming limited liability companies were
registered with the Wyoming Secretary of State. Id.
2.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353,357 (Wyo. 2000); Brief of Appellant
E. Michael Lieberman at 10, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004)
(No. 01-193). As of this writing, the only other case to address the Wyoming LLC is Kaycee
Land and Livestock v. Flahive. See Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323
(Wyo. 2002) (addressing whether piercing the Wyoming LLC veil was a possibility).
3.
Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for CorporateLaw, 73
WASH. U. L. Q. 433, 448 (1995).
4.
Id. at 446-47.
5.
Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing ContractualFreedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraintson Opportunisticand Abusive Conduct in the LLC. 152 U.
PA. L. REv. 1609, 1610-11 (2004).
6.
Tammy Savidge Moore, The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a Limited
Liability Company: McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 42 S.TEX. L. REV. 183, 186-87
(2000).
REGISTRATIONS REPORT 1
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$50,000. 7 One of three founding members, E. Michael Lieberman ("Lie-

berman"), was initially vested with a forty percent ownership interest based
on a capital contribution valued at $20,000.' On February 27, 1998, a cofounder and majority interest holder of the LLC terminated Lieberman's
employment as vice president and required he leave Wyoming.com's premises.9 Two weeks later, Lieberman served Wyoming.com a "Notice of
Withdrawal of Member Upon Expulsion: Demand for Return of Contributions to Capital."'" This notice requested the immediate return of Lieberman's "share of the current value of the company."" On March 17, 1998,
the remaining members of Wyoming.com approved the return of Lieberman's $20,000 capital contribution and elected to continue the legal existence of Wyoming.com.12 Lieberman declined the $20,000, however, having
anticipated the return of the fair market value of his equity interest in addition to his capital contribution, a value he estimated to be $400,000."
This case first came to the Fremont County District Court in June of
1998 as consolidated actions for summary judgment.' 4 Wyoming.com
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 355 (Wyo. 2000); Brief of Appellant
7.
E. Michael Lieberman at 7, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (9997).
8.
Lieberman I, 11 P.3d at 355. This capital contribution consisted of services rendered
and still to be performed. Id. When two new members were added to the LLC in August of
1995, Wyoming.com's Articles of Organization was amended to reflect each new member's
$25,000 capital contribution and two and one-half percent ownership interest. Id. The August 14, 1995 Amendment to the Articles of Organization mistakenly created interests totaling
to 105%. Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 4-5, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC,
11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97). This mistake was corrected in the January 20, 1996
Amendment to the Articles of Organization wherein Lieberman's interest was amended to
thirty-seven and sixty-two hundredths percent of ownership interest. Amendment to the
Articles of Organization of Wyoming.com LLC (Feb. 3, 1997) (on file with the Wyoming
Secretary of State). This factual discrepancy was not pursued, however, and both courts used
the forty percent number throughout Lieberman 1 (Lieberman v. Wyoming.corn LLC, 11 P.3d
353 (Wyo. 2000)) and Lieberman II (Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo.
2004)). Lieberman I, 11 P.3d at 360 n. 11; Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274,
279 (Wyo. 2004).
Lieberman I, II P.3d at 355. Paragraph 7.4 of Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement
9.
provided, "Any officer may be removed at any time by the Members with or without cause."
Id. at 356 n.4.
10.
Id. at 355.
II.
Id.
12.
Id. at 356.
13.
Id. at 355-56. This $400,000 figure, "based on a recent offer from the Majority
Shareholder," was used before Lieberman discovered the LLC's listing agreement, dated
February 16, 1998. Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 7, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (99-97). This listing agreement represented Wyoming.tom to have a value of $2,000,000, which would reflect a value of $800,000 to a forty
percent interest holder. Id. at 2, 13. A value of $400,000 as forty percent of the LLC is instep with a new member's capital contribution of $25,000 resulting in a two and one-half
percent ownership interest in August of 1995, over two and one-half years before Lieberman
withdrew from Wyoming.com. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14.
Lieberman I, 11 P.3d at 356.
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sought declaratory judgment as to its rights against Lieberman, and Lieberman sought the dissolution of Wyoming.corn in order to obtain the return of
his entire interest. 5 The district court held that Wyomning.corn was not in a
state of dissolution and that Lieberman could only demand the return of his
stated capital contribution, $20,000, to be paid in cash) 6 Lieberman ap15.
Id.
16.
Id. The remaining members of Wyoming.com had a right to continue, rather than
dissolve, the LLC based on their rights under its Articles of Organization, as granted by the
9 (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the
WLLCA. Wyoming.com Articles of Organization
Wyoming Secretary of State). Wyoming Statute section 17-15-123 provides:
(a) A limited liability company organized under this chapter shall be dissolved upon the occurrence of any of the following events:

(iii) Upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a member or occurrence of any other event which terminates
the continued membership of a member in the limited liability company,
unless the business of the limited liability company is continued by the
consent of all the remaining members under a right to do so stated in the
articles of organization of the limited liability company.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-15-123(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2004). Wyoming.com's Articles of Organization repeats the language of WLLCA section 17-15-123(a)(iii). Wyoming.corni Articles of
Organization 9 (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the Wyoming Secretary of State). Lieberman
did not deny Wyoming.com attempted to return his capital contribution. Lieberman 1, 11
P.3d at 359. This placed his situation under the authority of Wyoming Statute section 17-15120(a)(ii) rather than Wyoming Statute section 17-15-120(d)(i):
(a) A member shall not receive out of limited liability company property
any part of his or its contribution to capital until:
(i) All liabilities of the limited liability company, except liabilities to
members on account of their contributions to capital, have been paid
or there remains property of the limited liability company sufficient
to pay them;
(ii) The consent of all members is had, unless the return of the contribution to capital may be rightfully demanded as provided in this
act;
(iii) The articles of organization are cancelled or so amended as to
set out the withdrawal or reduction.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a member
may rightfuly demand the return of his or its contribution:
(i) On the dissolution of the limited liability company; or
(ii) Unless otherwise prohibited or restricted in the operating agreement, after the member has given all other members of the limited li-
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pealed, claiming the return of his contribution to capital should not be limited to his initial capital contribution, but should include the fair market
value of his entire interest in Wyoming.com."7
While the Wyoming Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in Lie-

berman I that Lieberman was entitled to the return of his capital contribution
of $20,000 and that Wyoming.com was not in a state of dissolution, the
court realized a gap existed in the WLLCA as to what would become of a
Since Wyowithdrawing member's equity, or ownership, interest. 8
ming.com's Operating Agreement did not provide for this scenario either,

the court found no evidence Lieberman's forty percent ownership interest

had been canceled or forfeited.' 9 In remanding the question of what would
become of Lieberman's equity interest, the Wyoming Supreme Court sug-

gested Lieberman's LLC membership certificate might contain additional

pertinent contract language.2

ability company prior notice in writing in conformity with the operating agreement. If the operating agreement does not prohibit or restrict the right to demand the return of capital and no notice period is
specified, a member making the demand must give six (6) months
prior notice in writing.
(c) In the absence of a statement in the articles of organization to the contrary or the consent of all members of the limited liability company, a
member, irrespective of the nature of his or its contribution, has only the
right to demand and receive cash in return for his or its contribution to
capital.
(d) A member of a limited liability company may have the limited liability company dissolved and its affairs wound up when:
(i) The member rightfully but unsuccessfully has demanded the return of his or its contribution; or
(ii) The other liabilities of the limited liability company have not
been paid, or the limited liability company property is insufficient
for their payment and the member would otherwise be entitled to the
return of his or its contribution.

§ 17-15-120 (LexisNexis 2004).
Lieberman I, 11 P.3d at 356, 359. Lieberman used "fair value" and "fair market
17.
value" interchangeably, indicating at times he also expected a value reflective of the company
as a "going concern." E.g., Brief of Appellant at 9-16, 22, Lieberman (No. 99-97). See also
Brief of Appellee Wyoming.com LLC at 11, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353
(Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97).
18.
LiebermanI, 11 P.3d at 360-61.
Id.at 361.
19.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274,281 (Wyo. 2004).
20.
WYo. STAT. ANN.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol5/iss1/10

4

Rogers: Business Organizations - Staying Afloat with a Hole in the Wyomin
2005
CASE NOTE

With no new evidence produced upon remand, Wyoming.com
moved for partial summary judgment.2 The LLC asked the district court
two questions: (1)"at what time should Lieberman's equity interest be valued?" and (2) "how should it be valued?" 22 In response, the district court

applied a paragraph of the LLC's Operating Agreement pertaining to member interests upon liquidation as applying to a member's withdrawal of
membership (dissociation).23 The subsequent calculation of Lieberman's
capital account resulted in a negative amount; and, Lieberman again appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.24

For a second time, the Wyoming Supreme Court was faced with the
question of what should become of a dissociated member's equity interest in
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 277, 281.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278-79. The majority discerned,
In granting summary judgment, the district court relied upon paragraph
6.2. However, paragraph 6.2 contains no provision addressing the rights
and obligations of the members with regard to a member who has withdrawn. Paragraph 6.2 provides a method for distributing capital upon liquidation. It contains no indication of when liquidation can or must occur.
It does not mandate a buyout or a liquidation of a member's equity interest. As such, it has no application to the immediate issue and the district
court's reliance upon it was misplaced.

Id. at 279.
24.
Id. at 277. The Fremont County District Court ordered liquidation of Lieberman's
equity interest at its capital account value as of the date of withdrawal. Id. at 275. Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement provides:
The Company shall maintain accurate records of the Capital Accounts of
the Members. Each Member's capital account shall be credited with:
a. The amount of money the Member has contributed to the Company.
b. The fair market value of property the partner has contributed to
the Company.
c. The Member's distributive share of Company income and gain.
Each Member's capital account shall be debited with:
a. The amount of money distributed to the Member by the Company.
b. The fair market value of property distributed to the Member by the
Company.
c. The Member's distributive share of Company loss and deduction.
Wyoming.corn Operating Agreement

6.1 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Wyoming.com LLC).
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the absence of a controlling statute or LLC provision." In a 3-2 decision,
the majority declared that without an express contractual provision to the

contrary, Lieberman would simply maintain his forty percent equity interest
while no longer being a member.' Lieberman would no longer have the
salary or business control of a vice-president but would still be required to
pay taxes on forty percent of the LLC's profits. 27 Each remaining LLC

member was to have their interests increased in value by their termination of
Lieberman as vice president resulting in his withdrawal.28
While this case note focuses on the choice of law options available
and utilized in handling the squeeze-out identified in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, the reader should keep in mind the same list of options are
available towards other gaps in LLC formation.29 This paper first considers
the historical background of the LLC, briefly touching on characteristics of
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA") and the current
LLC statutes of Idaho, Colorado, and Delaware, as states which may be
competing with Wyoming for LLC business.3" Next addressed are the development of fiduciary duties in business entities, and the recognition of

25.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 279-81. No new evidence was provided for the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Lieberman II. Id. at 281. As Justice Golden noted,
[I]n Lieberman I this Court determined that further information might be
available to help identify the contractual rights and obligations of the
members upon the withdrawal of a member. Despite this Court's suggestion that the membership certificates might contain applicable contractual
language, upon remand, the parties elected to introduce no additional evidence.
Id. at 280-81.
26.
Id. at 274, 282. Wyoming.com's questions of valuation were left unanswered, regarded by the court as "moot." Id. at 276.
Id. at 282, 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). The dissent recognized the realities of the
27.
majority's decision:
In fact, the majority's resolution has created a situation where the remaining members are in a position of power to dictate the terms of any negotiations for a buyout. The remaining members are now conceivably in a
position to retain earnings and avoid distributions, but as an equity owner
Lieberman would still be required to pay taxes on those earnings. Additionally, Lieberman is no longer a member. He will not be drawing the
salary of the member or controlling his equity interest in any manner.
Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See infra notes 162, 165-66, 233 and accompanying
text.
28.
Lieberman H1, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 27.
29.
See infra notes 181-232 and accompanying text. Direction may be taken from the
default rules of fiduciary duties, corporation or partnership law as a rooted in the WLLCA, or
from a strict, plain language contractual approach. Id.
30.
See infra notes 35-82, 94-96, 98-104 and accompanying text.
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such duties in LLC acts and common law.3 After an explanation of the arguments presented and rejected by the Wyoming Supreme Court, a more
conscientious scrutiny of the parties' agreement, with regards to the legislative intent of the WLLCA and the default rules of fiduciary duties, is shown
to provide a different outcome than the majority's conclusion.3 2 In conclusion, consideration is given to the resulting ramifications of the Wyoming
Supreme Court's decision in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC.33
BACKGROUND

HistoricalDevelopment of the LLC- "Let'sjustmake an LLC"34
Created by state statute, a limited liability company is known as a
hybrid between a partnership and a corporation.35 Since Wyoming passed
the first LLC act in 1977, the LLC has grown to be a favored form of business entity because it offers members active participation with the limited
liability advantages of a corporation and the taxation benefits of a partnership.36 Limited liability prevents members from being held liable for the
31.
See infra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
32.
See infra notes 127-232 and accompanying text.
33.
See infra notes 236-242 and accompanying text.
34.
What anyone in Wyoming might say in considering a new business entity for any
purpose. See supra note I. From 1992 to 1996 LLCs increased by over 2300%, corporations
increased by 13%, and limited partnerships increased by 15% according to a compilation of
the individual secretaries of state records by the International Association of Corporation
Administrators. Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-out Rights, FiduciaryDuties, and Dissolution
Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?,
38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 442 (2001) ("LLCs span a significant range of business classifications, including engineering and management support services, real estate, construction and
general contracting, investments, retail, health services, amusement and recreation, agriculture, oil and gas, restaurants, and leasing services.").
35.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.tom LLC, I I P.3d 353, 357 (Wyo. 2000); Lieberman v.
Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274, 283 (Wyo. 2004) (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
36.
Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence ofthe Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1,
*3 (1995) [hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence]. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Originsand Antecedents, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 855, 855 (1995); Lieberman 11, 82 P.3d at
283 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). The WLLCA was originally created to mirror the limitada, a
Latin business entity the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company of Denver had used in the early
1970s for foreign oil and gas operations. Carney, at 857-58; Letter from Hamilton Brothers
Oil Company to Judge Walter Urbigkit, Chief Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court I (June
5, 1992) (on file with the Wyoming Supreme Court as attachment to Brief of Appellant E.
Michael Lieberman, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 9997)) [hereinafter Hamilton Bros.]. Hamilton Brothers had received rulings from the IRS
allowing members who participated in a Panamanian limited liability company to maintain
limited liability with flow-through U.S. tax benefits. Hamilton Bros., at I. The company
sought a similar domestic entity, and upon forming their first Wyoming LLC immediately
sought this federal tax status. Id. Three and one-half years after the act's passage, Hamilton
Brothers obtained a private letter ruling from the IRS recognizing the Wyoming LLC to have
the tax status of a partnership. Id.; Carney, at 858. The day before this ruling was issued,
however, the Internal Revenue Service proposed all entities with limited liability be taxed as
corporations, regardless of their other characteristics. Hamilton Bros., at 1. These proposed
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company's debts and obligations, which increases investor confidence by
protecting members' personal assets from LLC debt satisfaction.3" Partnership tax status allows taxable income generated by the LLC to be computed
based upon the entity's earnings, then proportionally allocated, or passedthrough, to each member based on that member's interest in the LLC.3"
Members then pay tax on this LLC income as part of their personal income;
an LLC, unlike a corporation, is not a separate tax paying entity.39 Such a
tax structure is often preferred because even if the LLC is not profitable,
losses and tax credits pass-through to members for use on their personal income tax return. 40 This structure avoids the double taxation issue of Ccorporations, wherein taxes on earnings are paid both by the corporation and
by its shareholders
when dividends are added to shareholders' ordinary in1
come.

4

In 1988, IRS Revenue Ruling 88-76 held that a Wyoming LLC
could be classified as a partnership and not as a corporation for federal tax
purposes if it has no more than two of the following four corporate characteristics: continuity of life, centralized management, free transferability of
interests, and limited liability. 42 The WLLCA reflects this tax structure in its
new regulations were clearly inconsistent with the Hamilton Brothers' ruling. Id. Regardless
of this discrepancy, Florida passed its LLC act in 1982 to draw international investors, familiarand comfortable with the limitada,to the state. Carney, supra note 36, at 858, 861. Other
states quickly passed state statutes only after the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76 in 1988,
however. Id. at 858. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. This ruling resolved the
conflict between the Hamilton Brothers private letter ruling and proposed tax regulations.
Carney, supra note 36, at 858.
37.
Macey, supra note 3, at 435, 447-48.
38.
Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in
Search ofPolicy, 50 Bus. LAW. 995, 995 (1995).
39.
Macey, supra note 3, at 434. S-corporations are another type of pass-through entity
available to investors. Carter G. Bishop, Treatment of Members Upon Their Death and Withdrawalfrom a Limited Liability Company: The Casefor a Uniform Paradigm,25 STETSON L.
REv.255, 258 (1995). This structure is limited, however, in that it does not have all the tax
advantages of a partnership. Id.
40.
Goldberg, supra note 38, at 995.
41.
Macey, supra note 3, at 434. A C-corporation differs from an S-corporation in that it
is subject to income taxation as an entity separate from its shareholders under Subchapter C of
the IRS. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS 430,449 (Aspen Law & Business
1996). Dividends are distributions of the net income on which the corporation has already
paid taxes. Goldberg, supra note 38, at 995.
42.
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. A business entity has the corporate characteristic
of "continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion
of any member will not cause a dissolution of the organization." Tassma A. Powers & Deby
L. Forry, PartnershipTaxation & The Limited Liability Company: Check Out the Check-theBox Entity Classification,32 LAND & WATER L. Rav. 831, 839 (1997). The corporate characteristic of centralized management exists when anyone other than all of the members of an
organization has control of the entity's business management decisions-managers are not
necessarily LLC members. Id. at 840. Free transferability of interests is a corporate characteristic wherein a member can fully transfer his entire interest (i.e., control and a share in
profits) without the consent of any other members. Id. at 842. "An organization has the
corporate characteristic of limited liability if under local law there is no member who is per-
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default provisions related to these characteristics, other than limited liability,
mimicking a partnership structure unless contracted to follow the corporate
form.43 A Wyoming LLC will dissolve upon either its expiration date, the
unanimous agreement of all members, or "the death, retirement, resignation,
expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a member or occurrence of any other
event which terminates the continued membership of a member in the limited liability company," unless the remaining members unanimously consent
to continue the LLC under a right to do so in its articles of organization." A
Wyoming LLC will be managed by all of its members in proportion to their
capital contributions unless the LLC's articles of organization allows for
elected managers to manage the company.
Under the WLLCA, noneconomic rights cannot be transferred unless all members consent to the
transferee's assumption of such rights. 6

sonally liable for the debts of or claims against the organization." Id. at 841. These rules of
classification are often referred to as "Kinter Regulations," from the case United States v.
Kinter. Id. at 836. See United States v. Kinter, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
43.
See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. The corporate characteristic of limited
liability is one of the main draws to the LLC. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Wyoming Statute section 17-15-113 provides, "Neither the members of a limited liability
company nor the managers of a limited liability company managed by a manager or managers
are liable under a judgment, decree or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt,
obligation or liability of the limited liability company." WYO.STAT. ANN.§ 17-15-113 (LexisNexis 2004).
44.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (LexisNexis 2004). Section 17-15-123 of the WLLCA
explains events triggering dissolution of an LLC. See supra note 16.
45.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-116 (Lexis 2004). Section 17-15-116 of the WLLCA
pertains to the management structure of an LLC unless otherwise contracted.
Management of the limited liability company shall be vested in its members, which unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement shall be
in proportion to their contribution to the capital of the limited liability
company, as adjusted from time to time to properly reflect any additional
contributions or withdrawals by the members; however, if provision is
made for it in the articles of organization, management of the limited liability company may be vested in a manager or managers who shall be
elected by the members in the manner prescribed by the operating agreement of the limited liability company.
id.
46.
Id. § 17-15-122 (LexisNexis 2004). Section 17-15-122 of the WLLCA is considered
a "bulletproof' provision because it ensures an LLC will not be corporate-like in its transferability of interest:
[I]f
all of the other members of the limited liability company other than
the member proposing to dispose of his or its interest do not approve of
the proposed transfer or assignment by unanimous written consent, the
transferee of the member's interest shall have no right to participate in the
management of the business and affairs of the limited liability company
or to become a member. The transferee shall only be entitled to receive
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Until January 1, 1997, as long as only one additional corporate characteristic was paired with limited liability, an LLC would be taxed as a partnership.47 After Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-3, however, a limited

liability company was no longer limited to two of the four corporate characteristics in order to be taxed as a partnership." State LLC acts could thus be
seen as contractarian, or "enabling" statutes.49 Federal tax stipulations that

originally influenced the WLLCA were no longer a concern. 5 °

Without federal tax guidelines as a tail to wag the dog, one may
wonder what defines an LLC today. An LLC is a state business organization
that is unincorporated with members and managers who do not have vicarious liability for the company and may be federally taxed as a partnership,
corporation, tax-exempt entity, or disregarded for federal tax purposes."'

This broad definition is a result of the business structure's flexibility.52
While an LLC might often be construed as having the corporate aspect of
limited liability with federal taxation treatment as a partnership, it is no
longer limited to such a structure. 3 Thus, one of the advantages of an LLC
the share of profits or other compensation by way of income and the return of contributions, to which that member would otherwise be entitled.
Id. IRS Revenue Procedure 95-10 requires only a majority, not unanimous consent. Rev.
Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
47.
Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584-87 (Dec.
18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 301, 602). See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
48.
Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584-87 (Dec.
18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 301, 602). While state law may create different
types of business organizations, it is important to note federal law has its own separate regulations for federal tax purposes. Id. at 66,585. As long as LLCs are not classified as associations or corporations, or as "joint-stock companies, insurance companies, organizations that
conduct certain banking activities, organizations wholly owned by a State, organizations..
taxable as corporations under a provision of the Code other than section 7701(a)(3), and certain organizations formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction (including a U.S. possession, territory, or commonwealth)," they could choose to be taxed either as a partnership or
corporation by merely "checking the box." Id.
49.
Carney, supra note 36, at 862. LLC statutes, while often having default provisions
should parties neglect to consider for certain provisions, can be understood to be mainly
"enabling" legislation because LLCs, by nature, are based on the "notion that parties will
contractually fine-tune the parameters of their legal relationship in the governing documents
of the business entity." Miller, supra note 5, at 1615.
50.
Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584-87 (Dec.
18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 301, 602). The original WLLCA is often referred
to as a "bulletproof' state LLC statute because of its rigid formulation in order to ensure that
an entity be taxed like a partnership rather than a corporation. Charles W. Murdock, Limited
Liability Companies in the Decade ofthe 1990s: Legislative and CaseLaw Developments and
Their Implicationsfor the Future, 56 Bus. LAw. 499, 501 (2001).
51.
1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIITED
LIABILITY COMPAi'nES § 1.3 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE].
52.
Id.
53.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-144 (LexisNexis 2004) on the flexible limited liability
company.
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is that members can tailor its management and economic structure, to the
extent they do not create a per se corporation."'
Anticipating the IRS "check-the-box" regulation, which lifted the no

more than two out of four corporate characteristics requirement for partnership taxation, Wyoming and other states passed "flexible" LLC statutes."
Unlike the original "bulletproof' LLC acts, these flexible LLC statutes reflected the change in federal tax law allowing an LLC to have as many corporate characteristics as it desired-without becoming a full-fledged corporation-and still be taxed as a partnership by not "checking the box" on its
income tax returns. 6 Without this federal tax requirement as a common
denominator, the understanding and predictability of what exactly an LLC is
to an investor, creditor, or consumer became increasingly unclear as each
state had less direction in developing its approach to the LLC.5 Hence, in

an effort "to draft a flexible act with a comprehensive set of default rules
designed to substitute as the essence of the bargain for small entrepreneurs
and others," the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act was published by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") in 1994 and approved by the American Bar Association House
of Delegates in 1996.)
The ULLCA reflects not only the relaxed federal tax guidelines but
also represents the approach adopted in current state LLC legislation to establish a business form that is "essentially contractual in nature."59 In determining default outcomes to member dissociation, the ULLCA considers
different combinations of factors such as whether the LLC exists for a specified term or "at-will," whether it will be managed by members or managers,
and if managers are to be members.' Thus, the ULLCA guidelines are
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 51, at § 1.4; Simplification of Entity Classification
54.
Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,585 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 301,
602). See supra note 48.
55.
Murdock, supra note 50, at 501. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-144, for the Wyoming "flexible limited liability company" established in 1995.
Powers & Forry, supra note 42, at 831-32.
56.
Murdock, supra note 50, at 501-02.
57.
UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT, prefatory note (1996), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/58.
fnact99/1990s/ullca96.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2004); RIBSTEIN & KEATiNGE, supra note 51,

at § 1.8.
Murdock, supra note 50, at 502. As of June 2004, only eight states have adopted
59.
portions of the ULLCA. RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 51, at § 1.8. Alabama, Hawaii,
Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have all adopted significant portions of the ULLCA. Id. In 2003 the NCCUSL
decided to revise the act, possibly due to a lack of state adoption. Id.
Bishop, supra note 39, at 265-66. Under the ULLCA, withdrawing members of a
60.
term LLC are treated as transferees. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603(b)(1) (1996). If the
company continues beyond its specified term, the member's distributional interest must be
bought on the date the LLC would have expired. Id. § 603 (a)(2)(ii). This means until the
end of the term, such withdrawn members cannot force a buyout upon dissociation and are
entitled to any distributions but no longer have any management rights. Bishop, supra note
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much more complex than simply opting to follow either partnership or corporation rules upon member dissociation. 6' Traditionally, a partner's withdrawal always resulted in the dissolution of a partnership.62 The term "dissociation," however, was introduced in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
in response to the development of different outcomes resulting from a partner's withdrawal: depending on the situation, withdrawal could result in
dissolution of the partnership or a buyout of the partner's interest.63 By
comparison, withdrawal of a shareholder's participation from a corporation
generally does not require the corporation to purchase that shareholder's
interest nor does it threaten the life of the company.'
Most state LLC acts enacted before the "check-the-box" regulations

follow the partnership model in regards to dissociation and dissolution in

order to ensure pass-through tax treatment. 65 Section 17-15-123 of the
WLLCA is typical of such a provision in its assurance that the corporate
model is not followed in regards to continuity of life unless agreement is
reached after an event triggering dissolution.66 The "check-the-box" regulations spurred some states to adopt flexible LLC statutes, which no longer
required a subsequent agreement to continue the LLC upon the death, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member. 6'
It is interesting to note how more recent LLC statutes, in states such
as Idaho, Colorado, and Delaware, which may be competing with Wyoming

39, at 272-73. Wyoming.com was to exist for thirty years from the date its Articles of Organization were filed. Articles of Organization of Wyoming.com LLC 2 (Feb. 3, 1997) (on
file with the Wyoming Secretary of State). While the president and vice-president of Wyoming.com at the time of Lieberman's withdrawal were both members of the LLC, its
"[o]fficers need not be selected from among the [m]embers." Wyoming.com Operating
Agreement 7.2 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Wyoming.com LLC).
61.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62.
UNIF. P's-m' ACT § 29 (1914) ("The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as
distinguished from the winding up of the business.").
63.
UNIF. P'sHIP ACT §§ 601,603, 701,801 (1997).
64.
Bishop, supra note 39, at 260-61. Shares are freely transferable in a public corporation and a corporation has continuity of life. See supra note 42.
65.
Miller, supra note 34, at 426-28.
66.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (LexisNexis 2004). See supra note 16.
Miller, supra note 34, at 429-30. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-144 (LexisNexis
67.
2004). The WLLCA states:
[A] flexible limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be
wound up upon the occurrence of any event described in W.S.
17-15-123(a) ... unless the business of the flexible limited liability company is continued either by the consent of all of the remaining members..
• or pursuant to a right to continue stated in the operating agreement.
WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 17-15-144(c) (LexisNexis 2004).
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for LLC business, handle member dissociation." Under the Idaho Limited
Liability Company Act, if a dissociating member is not removed via a provision in the operating agreement or is unable to assign all of his or her interest
with the consent of the majority of remaining members, dissolution is not
triggered, but he or she is treated as an assignee from the date of dissociation,69 Such a dissociating member would be entitled to receive distributions
as before dissociation, but would be unable to exercise the management and
other rights of a member.70 If a dissociating member is removed from an
Idaho LLC via a provision in the operating agreement, he or she receives the
"fair value" of his or her entire interest as of the date of dissociation. 7' Both
Idaho and Colorado LLC statutes allow for damages should a member's
withdrawal breach his or her operating agreement.7 ' The Colorado LLC
statute also provides that upon resignation or withdrawal a member will be
treated similar to an assignee or transferee; dissolution only occurs upon the
unanimous agreement of all Colorado LLC members.7 3 Unless otherwise
provided in the operating agreement, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act does not allow a member to resign prior to the dissolution and
winding up of the LLC.7 Accordingly, the resignation of a Delaware LLC
68.
See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. Colorado borders Wyoming to the
south; the Colorado LLC Act was adopted in 1990. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-101 (West
2004). Idaho borders Wyoming to the west; the Idaho LLC Act was adopted in 1993. IDAHO
CODE § 53-601 (LexisNexis 2004). Delaware is a popular state for business registrations; the
Delaware LLC Act was adopted in 1997. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2004).
69.
IDAHO CODE §§ 53-630, 53-641(c) (LexisNexis 2004).
70.
Id. §§ 53-630(2), 53-636.
71.
Id. §§ 53-630(1), 53-641(l)(c). This "fair value" provision can be contracted around,
as in Lamprecht v. Jordan, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court held a withdrawing member
could not seek the fair market value of his interest because the LLC's operating agreement
had already established that an exiting member's interest would be limited to the value of his
capital account. Lamprecht v. Jordan, 75 P.3d 743, 745-48 (Idaho 2003).
72.
IDAHO CODE § 53-641(3) (LexisNexis 2004); COLO. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-602
(West 2004). Under Idaho law, these damages may offset distributions by "including the
reasonable costs of obtaining replacement of the services the withdrawn member was obligated to perform." IDAHO CODE § 53-641(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
73.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-603, 7-80-801 (West 2004). In a Colorado LLC,
such a member is "entitled only to receive the share of the profits or other compensation by
way of income and the return of contributions, to which such member would have been entitled if the member had not resigned or withdrawn." Id. § 7-80-603.
74.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (2004). This statute specifically states:
A member may resign from a limited liability company only at the time or
upon the happening of events specified in a limited liability company
agreement ....
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary under applicable law, unless a limited liability company agreement provides otherwise,
a member may not resign from a limited liability company prior to the
dissolution and winding up of the limited liability company. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary under applicable law, a limited liability
company agreement may provide that a limited liability company interest
may not be assigned prior to the dissolution and winding up of the limited
liability company.
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member does not trigger dissolution, unless so provided in the operating
agreement."
The policy of freedom of contract is touted as underlying the Colorado LLC Act, the Delaware LLC Act, and the Delaware Limited Partnership Act, on which Delaware's LLC act is largely based. 76 In Walker v. Resource Development Co. Ltd., L.L.C., an attempt to unilaterally remove an
LLC member and keep his ownership interest without a supporting provision
in the operating agreement failed. 77 The court found a "fundamental principle under Delaware law [is] that a majority of the members (or stockholders)
of a business entity, unless expressly granted such power by contract, have
no right to take the property of other members (or stockholders)."78 The
members of the LLC claimed a removal and expropriation of the member's
interest was justified by the member's breach of fiduciary duty. 9 The court
rejected this argument, finding it to be "troubling" because while the member had a relationship involving trust and confidence with the LLC "an apparent limit on liability for breach of fiduciary duty is to be interpreted
broadly" so as not to include misappropriation of a member's property.'
Furthermore, "members of an LLC [are] to rely in good faith on the terms of
the operating agreement in the context in which it appears in the statute, and
with regard to the general tenor of the statute as a whole.""1 Hence, the
Delaware Court in this situation held the member's economic interest would
be held in a constructive trust of the LLC's shares in the percent of the
member's interest before expulsion."

Id.
75.
76.
ANN.

Id. § 18-801(b).
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999). See DEL. CODE
tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(b), 17-1101(c) (2003); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108(4) (West

2004).

77.
78.

Walker v. Res. Dev. Co. Ltd., L.L.C., 791 A.2d 799, 800, 813 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Id. at 815. The Delaware Court of Chancery stated:
Other mechanisms may be available to them to recast their business rela-

tions to eliminate persons from the enterprise, such as the merger provisions of the various business entity laws. But, these provisions do not
provide for the forfeiture of economic rights, requiring instead that the

persons whose interests are eliminated are entitled to receive fair value
therefor.
Id.
79.
Id. at 814. The members of the LLC were interpreting title 6, section 18-1104 of the
Delaware LLC Act, which states, "In any ease not provided for in this chapter, the rules of
law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern." Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
18-1104 (2003)).
80.
Id. at 814-17.
81.
Id. at 817.

82.

Id.at 818.
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Role of FiduciaryDuties- "But to say that a man is afiduciary only begins
analysis.... ,"

Fiduciary duties arise when one party is dependent upon another for
higher levels of responsibility and trust based on the nature of their relationship.84 Limited liability company members, managers, and officers can be

both agents and principals of an LLC depending on the situation." The capacity and expectations associated with a relationship define the scope of
fiduciary duties expected by each role. 6 While a fiduciary is understood to
be "one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and

candor," this definition does not clearly address the extent of each responsibility." Black's Law Dictionary defines "fiduciary relationship" as "a relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the
other on matters within the scope of the relationship."88 Hence, a comprehensive, pre-set definition of what exactly a fiduciary is does not exist, as the
meaning is determined by the nature of each relationship.89 At the same
time, it is well understood that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are
common aspects of fiduciary duties, and inherent in each is the duty to act
carefully and unselfishly.9"
A fiduciary's duty of care is intended to maintain management standards and prevent agents from extending their authority beyond the agreed
scope of their position.9' Duty of care obligations require a fiduciary to be
83.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (quoting Justice Frankfurter, "[Ilt
gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe
as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?").
84.
Miller, supra note 5, at 1622.
85.
Harvey Gelb, Liabilities of Members and Managers of Wyoming Limited Liability
Companies, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 133, 140-41 (1996). As explained by Professor Gelb:
Both members and managers may be LLC agents ....
In addition, a
member or manager may be using the LLC as his or her agent and may be
liable as a principal for what the LLC does under agency principles. For
example, a member or manager may be liable for a contract entered on his
or her behalf by the LLC acting as his or her agent.
Id.
86.
See Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 36, at *25-26 (discussing such scenarios as how
former members who have been fully compensated for their LLC interests no longer have the
expectation of a fiduciary relationship with remaining members, whether member successors
have management roles and expectations of fiduciary duties, and how the various capacities
of dissociating LLC members effects fiduciary expectations).

87.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

282 (2d pocket ed. 2001).

88.
Id.
89.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
90.
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 51, at § 9.1 ("In general, fiduciary duties help to
ensure that owners and managers act consistently with the interests of the firm and its members rather than in their own interests.").
91.
Id. §9.2.
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conscientious and well informed before making a decision. 92 The WLLCA
does not address LLC member fiduciary duty obligations.93 In comparison,
Idaho limits the duty of care liability to the LLC and its members to gross
negligence or willful misconduct, and Idaho LLC members do not owe a
duty of care or a duty of loyalty solely based on the fact they are a member,
unless otherwise contracted."4 The Colorado statute provides that an LLC
manager, regardless of whether or not he or she is a member, owes the LLC
a duty of care to refrain from grossly negligent behavior, reckless conduct,
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law." This statute
differs from the Idaho provision in that a duty of care is not statutorily
obliged to members by managers of a Colorado LLC.96
Maintaining a duty of loyalty requires acting in the principal's interest.9 7 Under Colorado law, LLC managers are obligated not to compete or
act in a conflict of interest with the LLC, and to hold in trust for the LLC any
92.
Miller, supra note 5, at 1622.
93.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -147 (LexisNexis 2004).
94.
IDAHO CODE § 53-622 (LexisNexis 2004). The Idaho Limited Liability Company Act
has the following provision related to the duties of those in control of Idaho LLCs:
Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement:
(1)A member or manager shall not be liable... to the limited liability company or to the members of the limited liability company for
any action taken or failure to act on behalf of the limited liability
company unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence or
willful misconduct.
(2) Every member and manager must account to the limited liability
company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived...
from:
(a) Any transaction connected with the conduct or winding up
of the limited liability company; or
(b) Any use fof the LLC's] property... entrusted to the person
as a result of his status as manager or member.
(3) One who is a member of a limited liability company in which
management is vested in managers ... and who is not a manager
shall have no duties to the limited liability company or to the other
members solely by reason ofacting in the capacityof a member.
Id. (emphasis added).
95.
CoLO.REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-404 (West 2004).
96.
Id. See supra note 94. Prior to July 1, 2004, the Colorado LLC Act provided an LLC
manager should perform his or her duties in good faith, in a manner he or she believes to be in
the best interest of the LLC, and with the care of an "ordinarily prudent person." COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 7-80-406 (West 2003) ("A person who so performs his duties shall not have any
liability by reason of being or having been a manager of the limited liability company.").
97.
RmSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 51, at § 9.7.
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"profit, property, or benefit" derived from the LLC's business or an appropriation of the LLC's opportunity.98 As with the duty of care, these duty of
loyalty obligations under Colorado law may be clarified in an LLC's operating agreement as long as they are not unreasonably reduced.' The Idaho
LLC Act is similar to the Colorado Act except instead of guarding against
the misappropriation of an LLC's opportunity, the Idaho Act protects "other
matters entrusted to the person as a result of his status as manager or member."' 0 As with duty of care provisions, the Idaho duty of loyalty provisions
apply to both managers and members, regardless of whether or not they hold
management positions."'1
Like the WLLCA, the Delaware LLC Act does not stipulate the duty
of care or the duty of loyalty for LLC members. 2 However, the Delaware
98.
99.
100.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-404 (West 2004).
Id. § 7-80-108.
IDAHO CODE § 53-622 (LexisNexis 2004).

101.

Id.

Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 36, at *4; Miller, supra note 5, at 1635; see DEL.
102.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2004). The Wyoming Business Corporation Act's standards of
conduct for directors under Wyoming statute 17-16-830 is the same expectation of officers
with discretionary authority under Wyoming statute 17-16-842.
An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under
that authority:
(i) In good faith;
(ii) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(iii) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in or at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties an officer is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other
financial data ....
(c) An officer is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning
the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted ....
(d) An officer is not liable for any action taken as an officer, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
(e) ...an officer, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders and, in his discretion, may consider any of the following:
(i) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors
and customers;
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statute protects a member or manager who relies in good faith on "opinions,

reports or statements presented to the limited liability company by any
of its other managers, members, officers, employees or committees of
the limited liability company."'' 3 The Delaware LLC Act is like the
ULLCA in that it allows for parties to reduce or eliminate their fiduciary duties in their written agreement, but does not allow for the elimination of good faith and fair dealing as an implied contractual covenant. )04

Although previously considered forms of fiduciary duties, the duties
of good faith and fair dealing under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act are
now considered a contract standard.'0 5
Wyoming follows the well-

(ii) The economy of the state and nation;
(iii) The impact of any action upon the communities in or near
which the corporation's facilities or operations are located;
(iv) The long-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
including the possibility that those interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation; and
(v) Any other factors relevant to promoting or preserving public or
community interests.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-842 (LexisNexis 2004). The duties managers owe to other members and to the LLC under the ULLCA parallel the duties owed by a partner to a partnership
and to other partners under the draft Wyoming has adopted of the Uniform Partnership Act,
with the following exceptions:
A partner's duty of loyalty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the
partners may by agreement identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.

The obligation of good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated by
agreement but the partners may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-404 (LexisNexis 2004). See UNiF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409
(1996).
103.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-406 (2004).
104.
Id. § 18-1101; UNIF.LTD. LtAB. Co. ACT § 103 (1996). The Colorado LLC Act stipulates "[a] member or manager shall discharge the member's or manager's duties to the limited
liability company and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing." COLO.REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-404(3) (West 2004).
105.
UNIF. P'sHnP ACT § 404, authors' cmt. (2004). The official comments of the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) clarified the meaning of "good faith" and "fair dealing" as:
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established rule that each party to a contract has obligations of good faith
and fair dealing in both performance and enforcement."
The Wyoming
Supreme Court defines "good faith" to mean "faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other

party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving
'bad faith' because they violate community standardsof decency,fairnessor
reasonableness."'17 The Uniform Commercial Code defines "good faith" as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing." ' 8 The implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires parties to act decently, fairly, and reasonably in regards to
the purpose
of the contract and the "justified" expectations of the other
09
party.

It is well accepted that partners under partnership law are fiduciaries
to the partnership and to each other, thereby owing one another "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, [as] the standard
of behavior.'
In corporate law, directors and officers have a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the company and thereby to the company's shareholders."' Due to the contractual nature of an LLC, however, inherent expectations of fiduciary duties do not readily exist." 2 In an LLC, not only is a
member not necessarily a manager, but a manager is not necessarily required

[A] contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual
nature of a partnership. It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary
duty arising out of the partners' special relationship. Nor is it a separate
and independent obligation. It is an ancillary obligation that applies
whenever a partner discharges a duty or exercises a right under the partnership agreement or the Act.
The meaning of "good faith and fair dealing" is not firmly fixed under
present law. "Good faith" clearly suggests a subjective element, while
"fair dealing" implies an objective component. It was decided to leave
the terms undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases.
UNIF. P'sIP ACT § 404 official cmt. (2004) (citation omitted).
106. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,220-21 (Wyo. 1994)
(rev'd on other grounds) (citation omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.").
107.
Wilder, 868 P.2d at 220 (citation omitted).
108.
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(20) (2004).
109.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting Justice Cardozo);
UNIF. P's P ACT § 404 (2004).
111.
See Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209 (I11.
App. 2d 2002); Squaw Mountain
Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo. 1991); Sandra K. Miller, What Standardsof
Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies, 68 ST.
JOttN's L. REv.21, 39 (1994).
112. Miller, supra note 5, at 1621-22.
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to be a member." 3 This can cause confusion, as the fiduciary roles of each
position are still developing in the LLC, a business entity which is not "one
size fits all."'' 4
A difference in the default rules of fiduciary duties among corporation and partnership members can be found in how a "squeeze-out" is handled by each entity."' A "squeeze-out" results when the minority interest
holder loses his or her employment and is voted out of management." 6

While the majority continues to receive salaries, it usually votes in its own
interest to no longer distribute dividends, so that the minority interest
holder's investment is lowered in value." 7 If the minority interest holder is
then able to sell, rather than forfeit, his or her interest to the remaining members, it is understood to be at a greatly reduced price." 8 A minority interest
holder is thereby squeezed-out of the fair value of his or her interest.' 9
When a squeeze-out occurs in a corporation, the minority shareholder may pursue a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 2 ° To succeed in such a
claim, the minority shareholder must prove the majority's actions fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule.' This requires the minority shareholder overcoming the presumption the majority acted as a fiduciary

113.
Miller, supra note I11, at 25.
114.
Id. at 28; Dennis S. Karjala, Limited Liability Companies: Planning Problems in the
Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 455,477 (1995).
115.
See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Limited Liability Companies: Squeeze-outs and
Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 497 (1995). See also infra
notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
116.
Gevurtz, supra note 115, at 499.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. The magnitude of a squeeze-out should be kept in mind:
The losses which a minority shareholder suffers in a squeeze-out are
sometimes catastrophic. [Sh]e may be deprived of any effective voice in
the making of business decisions. Not only that, [s]he may be locked out
of the company's premises; and majority participants may be able to
withhold from h[er] information on the affairs of the business and on
policies being adopted and decisions being made .... Quite commonly
when a participant invests in a close corporation she expects to work in
the business on a full-time basis. She may put practically everything she
owns into the business and expect to support herself from the salary she
receives as a key employee of the company. Whenever a shareholder is
deprived of employment by the corporation (as she frequently is in these
squeeze plays) she may be in effect deprived of her principal means of
livelihood.
F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION OF

MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 1:3 (2004).
119.
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
120.
Gevurtz, supra note 115, at 499.
121.
Id. at 504.
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in the interest of the company.12 2 When a conflict of interest exists, however, the defendant has the burden of proof of showing his or her action and

its results were entirely fair.1 13 Squeeze-outs are rarely found in partnerships
because members are able to demand a buyout if not dissolution upon their
withdrawal.'24 Because close corporation shareholders are like partners in
that they "usually know each other personally and are more likely to reach
decisions by 'a genuine interchange and pooling of views,"' these share25
holders, like partners, owe each other the "utmost good faith and loyalty.'
In such jurisdictions, a minority shareholder in a close corporation seeking
justice from a squeeze-out-which is a form of oppressive behavior that
exceeds "reasonable expectations"--may need to only "demonstrate that the
same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an alternative
course of action less harmful to the minority's interest."' 26
PRINCIPAL CASE
In Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, the Wyoming Supreme Court
consistently declined to look to partnership law, corporation law, other state
law, or fiduciary duties among LLC managers for guidance in handling a
withdrawing member's equity interest.'27 Rather, the court applied a strict
plain language contractual approach, maintaining it is the court's duty to
construe, not create, agreements in upholding the "paramount" public policy
of freedom of contract. 128
Under this approach, the Wyoming Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Lieberman I made two observations in regards to the language of
the WLLCA, which, together, exposed a hole within the statutory scheme.' 29
122.
Id. at 499-500.
123.
Miller, supra note 5, at 1642.
124.
Gevurtz, supra note 115, at 501-02.
125.
1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2 (Rev. 3d ed. 2004) (internal citation
omitted); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. App. Ct.. 1981). A
"close corporation" has few shareholders with no ready market for the company stock. I F.
HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS

AND LLCs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2 (Rev. 3d ed. 2004).
126.
Wilkes v. Springfield Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); Gevurtz,
supra note 115, at 499-501. "'Reasonable expectations' are those spoken and unspoken understandings on which the founders of a venture rely when commencing the venture." Harvey
Gelb, FiduciaryDuties and Dissolution in the Closely Held Business, 3 WYO. L. REV. 547,
575 (2003) (internal citation omitted). See infra note 227.
127.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, I I P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000); Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004). At most, the court in Lieberman I acknowledged
the formation of the limited liability company to be rooted in a mix of partnership and corporation characteristics. Lieberman 1, 11 P.3d at 357. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated it
did not look to other states' case law because of variations in statutes authorizing the creation
of LLCs. Id.
128.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 282.
129.
See infra text accompanying notes 130, 133.
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First, "a member's interest in an LLC consists of economic and non-

economic interests."'3 Capital contributions are a type of economic interest;

the right to receive profits and the ability to participate in management are

Under the WLLCA, a member's
examples of non-economic interests.'
capital contribution does not include the fair market value of a member's
interest.12

Next, the court noted the distinction between a member with-

drawing his capital contribution and a member withdrawing his membership

(dissociation).'33 In so doing, the court acknowledged the WLLCA addresses the rights and obligations of LLC members in regards to a member
withdrawing his or her capital contribution but not in regards to 3a4member's
non-economic interest upon withdrawing his or her membership.

130.
131.

Lieberman1,11 P.3d at 357.
Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court, specifically, stated:
Under the Wyoming LLC act, a member's interest in an LLC consists of
economic and non-economic interests. One interest is a member's capital
contribution, which a member may withdraw under certain conditions.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-15-115 and 120. A member also generally has the
right to receive profits. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-15-119. A member's interest also usually grants him the ability to participate in management. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 17-15-116. Overall, a member's interest is transferable, although the management rights of a transferee may be limited. Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 17-15-122. While these statutory provisions provide some guidance regarding a member's interest, we must also look at an LLC's operating agreement and articles of organization.

Id.
Id. at 359. The court did not find the value of Lieberman's capital contribution to
132.
have changed from its initial stated amount:
[N]othing in § 17-15-120 indicates that fair market value of a member's
interest is to be included in the amount to be paid to a member upon withdrawal of that member's capital contribution. In addition, § 17-15129(b)(i) requires amendment to an LLC's articles of organization when
the amount or character of contributions changes. Thus, the amount of a
member's capital contribution is a constant not subject to market fluctuations. Numerous LLC acts from other states do allow a member to receive the fair market value (or fair value) of the member's interest. However, those provisions generally contemplate dissociation, not simply
withdrawal of capital contributions.
Id. See supra note 16.
133.
Lieberman 1, 11 P.3d at 359. The court based this finding largely on the implication
of Wyoming Statute section 17-15-119 that a member may withdraw some or all of his capital
contribution while remaining a member. Id. "if the operating agreement does not so provide,
distributions shall be made on the basis of the value of the contributions made by each member to the extent they have been received by the limited liability company and have not been
returned." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-119 (LexisNexis 2004).
134.
Lieberman 1,1 P.3d at 360-61; Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274, 275
(Wyo. 2004). The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded, "[h]aving determined that § 17-15120 does not control a member's rights upon dissociation, we must determine what became of

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol5/iss1/10

22

Rogers: Business Organizations - Staying Afloat with a Hole in the Wyomin
2005
CASE NOTE

When no new contractual language was presented upon remand, the
Wyoming Supreme Court continued to maintain its strict plain language
contractual approach in Lieberman 11.135 In a 3-2 decision, the majority had
two bases of support in its holding that Lieberman would maintain his equity
interest while no longer being a member.136 First, the majority inferred from
an explicit provision of Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement allowing
someone buying into the LLC to have an equity interest without being a
member, that it was understood by the parties that a withdrawing member
could similarly maintain his equity interest while no longer being a member.' Hence, the Wyoming Supreme Court majority did not tie LLC membership to equity interests. 3 Next, the majority found support in the lack of
an express contractual provision indicating either party must buy or sell a
withdrawing member's equity interest for any amount.'39 In upholding the
public policy interest of freedom to contract, the majority declined to create
a solution to a scenario not provided for in the parties' written agreement as
it considered such action akin to altering the parties' contract. 4
In his first brief, Lieberman argued an LLC should be treated like a
partnership, not a corporation, in regards to a withdrawing member's interest. 4 ' He based this argument on both the origin of the LLC as well as provisions such as section 17-15-123 of the WLLCA which deal with member
interests similarly to a partnership. 42 Since a partner's withdrawal automatically triggers either the partnership's buyout of the withdrawing member's interest or the dissolution of the partnership, Lieberman maintained an
LLC member should likewise receive the fair value of his interest when the

Lieberman's interest, other than his capital contribution, in Wyoming.com." Lieberman II, 11
P.3d at 360; Lieberman, 82 P.3d at 279. See supra note 16.
135.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 277, 281-82. See supra note 25.
136.
Lieberman 11,82 P.3d at 274, 281-82. See infra notes 137, 139.
137.
Lieberman 11, 82 P.3d at 274, 281-82. Regarding the transfer of shares, Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement states:
If the transfer or assignment is made as originally proposed and the other
Members fail to approve the transfer or assignment by unanimous written
consent, the transferee or assignee will have no right to participate in the
management of the business and affairs of the Company or to become a
Member. The transferee or assignee will only be entitled to receive the
share of the profit or other compensation by way of income and the return
of contributions to which that Member would otherwise be entitled.
Wyoming.com Operating Agreement 4.3 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Wyoming.com LLC).
138.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 281-82.
139.
Id. at 282.
140.
Id. ("We have long held that it is the duty of this Court to construe contracts made
between parties, not to make a contract for them.").
141.
Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 4, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11
P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97).
142.
Id. at 10-14. See supra note 16.
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LLC elects to continue, rather than dissolve, upon a member's withdrawal.' 43
This argument relied heavily on section 17-15-120 of the WLLCA, entitled

"Withdrawal or Reduction of Members' Contributions to Capital," being
interpreted as pertaining to all of a member's interest.'"

Thus, Lieberman

initially advocated his capital account, as synonymous with "contributions to
capital" in representing the fair market value of his entire interest in the
LLC, should be liquidated according to Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement Article VI, entitled "Capital Accounts, Distribution of Profits and
Losses."' 45

In clarifying that a member's capital contribution is only one type of
LLC member interest, the unanimous decision of Lieberman I made clear

that provisions relating to the "capital contribution" of a member did not
apply to a member's equity interest.'46 As advocated by Wyoming.com, a
member's "capital contribution" was not found to be synonymous with, but
rather a subset of, a member's "capital account."' 4 7 This finding, coupled
143. Brief of Appellant at 4, 9-11, Lieberman (No. 99-97). Lieberman's brief here cited
the Uniform Partnership Act adopted in Wyoming Statute § 17-21-701:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that
would have been distributable to the dissociating partner ...

if, on the

date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price
equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of
the entire business as a going concern without the dissociated partner ....
In either case, the sale price of the partnership assets shall be determined
on the basis of the amount that would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller .... Interest shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the
date of payment.
Id. at 13 (citing Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-701 (LexisNexis 2004)). See supra notes 63 and
accompanying text. This effect of dissociation in a partnership is also reflected in Wyoming
Statute section 17-15-123. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (LexisNexis 2004). See supra
note 16.
144. Brief of Appellant at 16, Lieberman (No. 99-97). See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-120
(LexisNexis 2004); supra note 16.
145.
Brief of Appellant at 16-17, Lieberman (No. 99-97). Lieberman's first brief argued:
The Operating Agreement Articles 6.1 and 6.2 show that the Appellant's
capital account consists of the fair market value of his interest in the
Company. The District Court failed to recognize this section of the Operating Agreement. This provision in the Operating Agreement is consistent with the Act's provision allowing a withdrawing Member the return
of the fair market value of his capital.
Id. at 16.
146.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, II P.3d 353, 357-61 (Wyo. 2000).
147.
Brief of Appellee Wyoming.com LLC at 14, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, II
P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97). "Contributions to capital," the LLC maintained, is defined by section 17-15-115 of the WLLCA as "consist[ing] of cash or other property, promissory notes or services rendered or to be rendered," which does not include all aspects, but a
component, of a member's capital account as defined in Wyoing.com's Operating Agree-
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with the fact that the Wyoming Supreme Court would not look to partnership law or other states' law for applicable default rules, rendered the basis
of Lieberman's initial argument irrelevant.' 48 Nonetheless, when the Wyoming Supreme Court remanded the question of what had become of Lieberman's equity interest, the district court applied the calculation required upon
liquidation of the LLC in Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement Article
VI-the same valuation which would have occurred had Lieberman been
treated as a dissociating member of a partnership.'49
Despite the fact the district court's calculation method on remand
was what Lieberman had initially advocated to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, Lieberman appealed from the resulting negative value of his interest
in a successful LLC. 5° In his second brief to the Wyoming Supreme Court,
Lieberman maintained he was not required to sell his equity interest for the
LLC to continue.'
Rather, Lieberman maintained that without acceptance
of his "offer to withdraw and sell his interest for $400,000" outlined in his
"Notice of Withdrawal of Member Upon Expulsion: Demand for Return of
Contributions to Capital," he was not required to sell his equity interest
based on any contract or statutory provision.' 52 Therefore, Lieberman argued, he maintained his equity interest as both a member and an "economic
interest holder" of Wyoming.com. 53
'
Wyoming.corn also linked equity interest ownership to membership." 4 As such, the LLC agreed with the district court's calculation on remand, and maintained in its second brief that Lieberman did not retain his
ment paragraph 6.1. Id. at 11-12. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-115 (LexisNexis 2004).
Furthermore, Wyoming.com argued, "[i]f a member's capital account was equal to the member's contribution to capital, the articles of organization would need to be amended daily due
to the changes in the account. This is clearly not the outcome that the legislature intended."
Brief of Appellee at 14, Lieberman (No. 99-97). See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-129 (LexisNexis 2004). Hence, in its second brief, Wyoming.com agreed with the district court's
holding on remand, resulting in no amount due Lieberman for his equity interest. Brief of
Appellee Wyoming.corn LLC at 8, Lieberman v. Wyoming.corn LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo.
2004) (No. 01-193).
148.
Lieberman I, I I P.3d at 357; Brief of Appellant at 13-14, Lieberman (No. 99-97).
Lieberman's first brief also cited Minnesota and Indiana LLC case law. Brief of Appellant at
12, 18-19, Lieberman (No. 99-97).
149.
Lieberman 1I, 82 P.3d at 278-79. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
150.
Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 8, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82
P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004) (No. 01-193). The calculation resulted in him actually owing the company $8,800. Id.
151.
Id. at9.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. Lieberman now agreed with the Wyoming Supreme Court that the return of the
face value of Lieberman's capital contribution was all that was necessary for Wyoming.com
to continue under WLLCA section 17-15-120. Id.at 18. See supra note 16.
154. Brief of Appellee Wyoming.com LLC at 15, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82
P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004) (No. 01-193) ("The valuation of the equity interest of Lieberman must
be determined upon the date of his withdrawal from the company.").
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equity interest upon his withdrawal. 1" Supporting a plain language interpretation of the parties' agreements, the LLC focused on paragraphs 6.2 and 6.1
of its Operating Agreement. 5 6 These provisions do not call for "appraisals,
market values, estimates and other parole evidence" to be used in calculating
to be distributed upon the liquidation of a "memcapital account5 balances
7
ber's interest."'
Lieberman maintained a book value calculation of a member's equity interest under the WLLCA was inequitable to both minority and majority interest holders."" Should an LLC increase in value, the majority would
essentially be able to "steal" the minority's interest; and, should an LLC
decrease in value, the return of a set initial contribution could debilitate the
LLC.'59 To avoid such oppression of a minority interest holder, Lieberman
consistently argued fiduciary duties found in both Wyoming corporate and
partnership law should be extended to LLCs. 6 In response, Wyoming.com
maintained the legislative intent of the WLLCA indicated a minority interest
holder should not be able to hold an LLC hostage by threatening a withdrawal which
would trigger effective dissolution by forcing a buyout of his
6
interests.1 1
The dissent was mainly concerned with the unfairness of the majority's opinion.162 Wyoming Chief Justice Lehman, who had written the
155. Id. at 11, 3-4.
156. Id. at 9-10.
157. Id.at 9-11.
158. Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 20, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11
P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97).
159. Id. at 20-21.
160. Id. at 21; Reply Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 5, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97) (arguing injustice and that "[t]he interpretation argued by Appellee encourages majority Members of successful companies to run
off the minority Members and pick up their equity for a fraction of its value, a result clearly
not intended by the legislature"); Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 16, Lieberman
v. Wyorning.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004) (No. 01-193).
161.
Brief of Appellee Wyoming.corn LLC at 15, Lieberman v.Wyoming.tom LLC, 11
P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97).
162. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274, 284 (Wyo. 2004) (Lehman, C.J.,
dissenting). As Chief Justice Lehman explained,
In fact, the majority's resolution has created a situation where the remaining members are in a position of power to dictate the terms of any negotiations for a buyout. The remaining members are now conceivably in a
position to retain earnings and avoid distributions, but as an equity owner
Lieberman would still be required to pay taxes on those earnings. Additionally, Lieberman is no longer a member. He will not be drawing the
salary of the member or controlling his equity interest in any manner.
While it could be said that this situation arose because of Lieberman's
withdrawal, it should be noted that under the majority's analysis the result
would apply equally to an expelled member. In such an instance, some of
the members could expel a member and then refuse to negotiate for a
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unanimous opinion in Lieberman I, noted reasonable expectations of investors would indicate it is intuitive that "a withdrawing member does not envision that his withdrawal will result in this split in his interest."' 63 Furthermore, the majority's decision legitimized a power shift to the remaining
Under the majority's
members which "begs the oppression of one party.'
holding, Lieberman remained obligated to pay taxes on his portion of the
LLC's earnings while no longer receiving a salary or likely to receive distri-

butions since the remaining members were prone to retain earnings instead.'65 Such a scenario decreases the minority interest holder's ability to
In addition, the dissent noted both the WLLCA
negotiate a fair buyout.'
and Wyoming.com's Operating Agreement make no distinction between a

member's withdrawal or expulsion, such that the majority's holding can be
extended to allow for LLC members to expel a member and subsequently
refuse to negotiate a buyout. 167 Although the dissent agreed with the majorparties, it found
ity that the court should not create contractual provisions for
6
greater importance in not fostering opportunistic behavior.' 1
Hence, the dissent advocated WLLCA section 17-15-126, "Distribu-

tion of assets upon dissolution," be used to calculate a withdrawing member's equity interest on the date of his withdrawal. 169 This "valuation tool"
buyout. Such a result begs for the oppression of one party. While I agree
with the majority that it is not our duty to write contract provisions for
parties that have failed to do so, I believe it would be much worse to fail
to provide a remedy.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). The dissent did not use the term "reasonable expecta163.
tions." Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). While the parties' agreement did not expressly call for
a buyout, the dissent noted it also did not expressly identify the actualization of a former
member becoming only an equity owner; thus, a buyout would be expected more than the
other alternatives. Id at 283-84 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
164.
Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 162.
165.
Lieberman 11, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, CJ., dissenting). See supra note 162 and
infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
166.
Lieberman 1l, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 118.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting); Lieberman , 11 P.3d at 358.
167.
Lieberman 11, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
168.
169.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). Wyoming statute § 17-15-126 addresses the order of
asset distribution upon dissolution:
In settling accounts after dissolution, the liabilities of the limited liability
company shall be entitled to payment in the following order:
(i) Those to creditors, in the order of priority as provided by law,
except those to members of the limited liability company on account
of their contributions;
(ii) Those to members of the limited liability company in respect of
their share of the profits and other compensation by way of income
on their contributions; and
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was supported not because dissolution would be triggered by a member's
withdrawal, but as a default rule implicit in the WLLCA when parties did
not contract otherwise.'70 In the interest of fairness, the dissent advocated
Lieberman be compensated with the estimated value of his share had the
LLC dissolved on the date of his withdrawal and, if such approximations
were not available, the value of his interest in the LLC "could be based to
some extent on estimates and appraisals" on the date of his withdrawal.' 7 '

Furthermore, if the LLC could not pay the member his or her interest because of existing obligations as a continuing business, then72payment could

occur over a "reasonable" period rather than in a lump sum.1

The dissent favored such a forced buyout triggered by a member's
withdrawal based on the history of the WLLCA as well.' 73 The LLC combi-

(iii) Those to members of the limited liability company in respect of
their contributions to capital.
(b) Subject to any statement in the operating agreement, members share
in the limited liability company assets in respect to their claims for capital
and in respect to their claims for profits or for compensation by way of
income on their contributions, respectively, in proportion to the respective
amounts of the claims.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-15-126 (LexisNexis 2004).
170. Lieberman I, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). A decision in this area
could, arguably, serve as "preventive justice" in dissuading future litigation. Id. at 280. In
addressing how a withdrawing member's equity interest should be valued under the parties'
agreement, the dissent provided essentially the same answer as the district court on remand.
Id. at 278-79, 284-85 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted it was not acting to create
a valuation standard but to see if there was a provision which could be understood to be "logically" applicable as consented to under the WLLCA. Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Recognizing this choice paralleled partnership default rules, the dissent advocated the use of
WLLCA section 17-15-126, as if the LLC had dissolved, but without requiring actual dissolution. Id. at 283-84 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
171.
Id. at 284-85 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Lehman noted that Wyoming
statute section 17-15-126 provides:
[T]he proceeds upon dissolution are used to extinguish debt and then are
used not only to return a member's capital contribution but also to provide for the member's share of profits and other compensation by way of
income on that contribution. Such a provision can encompass many
things including the increase in value of any assets, any retained profits,
and the goodwill of the company. Therefore, fair market value, which
generally accounts for these relevant factors, would be a reasonable alternative estimate of the departing member's share.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-15-126 (LexisNexis 2004)).

172.
173.

Id. at 285 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 283 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Lehman noted:
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nation of partnership and corporation characteristics implies partnership exit
rules should apply when the LLC follows the partnership approach to continuity of life.174 Such a default rule dictates that the LLC would dissolve
should a member leave and, upon dissolution, a member would be compensated for his equity interest.'
The traditional exception to this partnership
exit rule is that the withdrawing member is compensated for his equity interest even when the company should elect to continue. 76
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Lieberman v. Wyoming.corn LLC was a disservice to the state and its business investors. More
conscientious scrutiny of parties' agreements is expected from a court which
extols freedom to contract as the "paramount public policy" and the "[t]he
primary purpose in interpreting or construing a contract is to determine the
intent and understanding of the parties.'" The majority completely disre-

At the time the legislature enacted the original LLC statutes, an important
consideration was the tax ramifications of the newly created entity. At
that time, in order to obtain taxation as a partnership, an LLC could have
no more than two of four corporate characteristics: limited liability, central management, free transferability of interests, and continuity of life.
The LLC entity provided for limited liability and central management.
Therefore, to avoid corporate taxation, the typical LLC statutes choose to
utilize partnership principles, rather than corporate principles, for exiting
members in order to avoid the LLC having continuity of life.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
174.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
175.
Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
176.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). As Chief Justice Lehman explained:
Partnership exit rules ordinarily allow for any partner to dissolve the firm
at any time and demand liquidation and accordingly be paid for his equity
interest. The legislature clearly recognized this as the normal partnership
rule and impliedly endorsed such a rule by providing for an exception to
this rule if the members agreed otherwise in their operating agreement. In
a sense, carrying on the business following a terminating event became
the exception to the general rule that the business would cease when a
member left for any reason. Thus, the resulting implication is a member
may terminate his membership in an LLC and must be paid for this interest unless otherwise provided.
Id. at 283 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
177.

Id. at 281-82. The Wyoming Supreme Court quoted Sir George Jessel, M.R.,
[11f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely
and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of
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garded clear indicators of Lieberman and Wyoming.com's understanding of
their agreement. 178 Had the majority taken into consideration the culmination of such factors as the plain language of the parties' agreement, the parties' behavior, the WLLCA, and the parties' fiduciary duties to one another,
the majority's contractual approach would have yielded the dissent's more
equitable outcome." 9
The majority focused on paragraph 4.3 of the Operating Agreement.'
Finding a logical corollary from the express provision that a transferee buying into the LLC could have an equity interest without being a
member, the majority held that such a provision indicated it was understood
by the parties that a withdrawing member would also maintain his equity
interest while no longer being a member.' 8' There are two problems with
this justification for the majority's decision.' 2 First, acting under the guideline of "[w]here an agreement is in writing and the language is clear and
unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be secured from the four comers of the
contract" the Wyoming Supreme Court acted as if this inference was clear
and unambiguous language of intent and declined to consider extrinsic evidence.' 3 This ignores the obvious argument that a person buying an interest
justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to considerthat you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.
Id. at 282 (internal citations omitted). The Wyoming Supreme Court indicated it would start
with, and then look no further than the four comers of the parties' written agreements only if
clear and unambiguous writing could be secured therein of the parties' intent and understanding. Id. at 281. The case cited by the majority herein goes on to say, "We consider the contract as a whole, taking into consideration the relationship between the various parts. 'We
turn to extrinsic evidence and rules of contract construction only when the contract language
is ambiguous and its meaning is doubtful or uncertain."' Collins v. Finnell, 29 P.3d 93,
99 (Wyo. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
178. See infra notes 197-99, 202, 225-32 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 180-235 and accompanying text.
180. Lieberman I, 82 P.3d at 281-82. Justice Golden discerned,
The operating agreements clearly anticipate a situation where a person
could be an equity owner in Wyoming.com but not a member. Provision
4.3 of the Operating Agreement ...

provides that, if a transferee of an

ownership interest is not unanimously approved by the remaining members, the transferee maintains the rights of equity ownership but will not
be a member. Logically, given the absence of any contractual provision
to the contrary, there is no reason to treat a withdrawing member any differently from someone who buys into Wyoming.com without becoming a
member. Thus, Lieberman is not a member of Wyoming.com, but he
maintains his equity interest and all rights and obligations attendant
thereto.
Id.
181.

Id.

182.

See infra notes 183, 185 and accompanying text.

183.

Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 281.
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as a transferee would be on express notice of the conditions of his or her
investment, whereas an initial investor, who may not have anticipated business relations to go awry, would not have realized his or her investment
could be frozen in such a manner given the relationship between the founding members at the beginning of their business venture. '84 Such reasoning
also ignores the fact that at the time of contracting, the parties did not only
not know if a member would withdraw, but which member might withdraw,
and with this uncertainty they probably would have agreed to a more fair
solution than the outcome of Lieberman v Wyoming.com LLC.
The second problem with the majority's justification for its decision
is that it acted as if not having a written agreement on what was to happen to
a member's equity interest upon his withdrawal was the same as agreeing to
not have a change in a member's equity interest upon his withdrawal.'85 The
majority proclaimed both, "[w]e decline to alter the contract as written and
accepted by these parties in the name of contract interpretation. We will
enforce the contract as written and accepted by the parties. Lieberman maintains his equity interest in Wyoming.com," and, "[u]pon careful review of all
the agreements entered into by the parties regarding Wyoming.com, we determine that the agreements contain no provision regarding the equity interest of a dissociating member."' 6 This decision by the Wyoming Supreme
Court is not only somewhat self-contradictory, but fails to address the parties' concerns.' 7 Had a gap not existed in the parties' agreement and the
WLLCA, Wyoming.com and Lieberman would not have come to court with
the question of how Lieberman's equity interest should be valued.' 8
In this case initiated as consolidated actions for summary judgment,
both parties' actions indicated a mutual assent to the return of Lieberman's
equity interest upon his withdrawal."8 9 As surmised by the majority itself,
"Obviously, the parties proceeded under the assumptions that: Lieberman
had withdrawn as a member and an equity owner; that he was entitled to his
equity interest; and a valuation and buyout was necessary.""'9 Lieberman's
notice of withdrawal indicated the expectation of the return of both his capital contribution and equity interest in Wyoming.com by his estimation of an
amount due of $400,000, not $20,000. 1 In advocating he maintain his equity interest in his second brief to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Lieberman

184.
See infra notes 215, 227 and accompanying text.
185.
See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
186.
Lieberman 11, 82 P.3d at 282, 275.
187.
Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
188.
Lieberman H1, 82 P.3d at 276-77, 282.
189.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, II P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo. 2000). Summary judgment is "granted on a claim about which there is no genuine issue of material fact." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 679 (2d pocket ed. 2001). See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
190.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 277.
191.
Id. at 279.
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referred to his "notice" of withdrawal as an "offer."' 92 As surmised by the
majority, "Wyoming.com argues that Lieberman's withdrawal as a member
mandates his withdrawal as an equity owner, thus triggering a liquidation of
his equity interest."' 3 Wyoming.com seemingly accepted that Lieberman's
equity interest should be returned because it filed a motion for partial summary judgment on remand asking the district court to determine not if it
should return Lieberman's equity interest, but when and how it should value
his equity interest. 4 Regardless of these facts, the court maintained Lieberman would keep his equity interest and a buyout would not occur.'95 Despite the Wyoming Supreme Court's strong public policy interest in construing, not creating, contractual terms, the majority appeared to create a situation that96 neither party agreed to at the time of contracting, or would agree to
today.1
Wyoming.com was created in September 1994, before federal tax
regulations lifted the requirement that an LLC may have only two of four
corporate characteristics in order to be taxed as a partnership. 97 At that
time, in order for an LLC such as Wyoming.com with corporate aspects of
centralized management and limited liability to be taxed as a partnership it
had to comply with federal taxation rules necessitating it follow partnership
law in regards to continuity of life and transferability of interests.'9 Hence,
at the time of contracting, Wyoming.com members more than likely understood their LLC would follow partnership law in regards to its continuity of
life characteristic since, like a partnership, Wyoming.com was to exist for a
specified term. 99 The dissent noted and applied this underlying partnership
structure of the WLLCA.2°° Again, a more conscientious investigation of the

192. See Lieberman I, 11 P.3d at 355; Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 9, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004) (No. 01-193).
193.

Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 281.

194.

Id. at 277.

195.

Id. at 275-76.

196. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text. It was only after the district court's
calculation resulted in a negative balance that Lieberman advocated keeping his equity interest. Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 8-9, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82
P.3d 274 (Wyo. 2004) (No. 01-193).
197. Wyoming.com Articles of Organization (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the Wyoming
Secretary of State). See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 42, 47 and accompanying text. The LLC did not have freely transferable shares. Wyoning.com Operating Agreement 4.3 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Wyoming.corn LLC). The LLC had centralized management. Id. 7.1-7.6.
199. Wyoming.com Articles of Organization 2 (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the Wyoming Secretary of State) ("Its period of duration is [thirty] years from the date of filing the
Articles of Organization with the Wyoming Secretary of State, unless sooner dissolved by the
members or as provided by statute."). Wyoming.com was to exist until September 30, 2024
unless otherwise dissolved. Id. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
200. Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 283-84 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
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parties' understanding at the time of contracting would have resulted in the
outcome advocated by the dissent.20'
The dissent also noted the realities of member perspectives in a
small company: "While a member's interest does in fact consist of an economic and non-economic interest, a withdrawing member does not envision
that his withdrawal will result in this split in his interest."2 2 The dissent's
concerns with the resulting unfairness and encouragement of opportunistic
behavior by the majority's decision support consideration of the default rules
among fiduciaries. 0 3 As a new state entity with little case law and no statutorily imposed fiduciary duty requirements, however, the question arises as
to what fiduciary duties should apply to LLC members. 2" This issue is perhaps best answered with consideration as to why fiduciary duties have become well established in other business entities. 5
Fiduciary relationships are dependent on reliable bonds of confidence and trust.2" If the law were to ignore the obligations inherent in fiduciary interactions, such bonds would be weakened so that fiduciaries could
not be relied upon to the full extent necessitated by their function, and both
business inefficiency as well as unfairness would occur.20 7 Hence, ethical
behavior is supported in the law out of both economic and equitable concerns. 0
The same reasoning that established fiduciary relationships between corporate officers/directors and their corporation's shareholders, between shareholders in a close corporation, and between partners in a partnership, justifies LLC members as co-owners and managers to be fiduciaries to
one another. 20 9 Fiduciary duties are necessary to such a relationship because

201.
See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
202. Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 283-84 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). While the dissent does
not use the word "fiduciary," it concerns itself with the majority's decision begging "the
oppression of one party." Id. at 284 (Lehman, C.., dissenting). See supra note 162.
203. Lieberman If, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 164-68 and
accompanying text.
204. Miller, supra note 5, at 1621-22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
206. Miller, supra note 5, at 1622.
207. Gelb, supra note 126, at 548. As noted by Professor Gelb,
It is important that fiduciary principles of loyalty and care be utilized to
safeguard investments of money and time. Nevertheless, there is more to
this issue than concern for economic considerations. There is the great
personal and psychological hurt felt by those who have been wronged by
their fiduciary allies in their business relationships. The law should take
this into account.
Id.

208. Id. at 547-48.
209. Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209-10 (Il. App. 2d. 2002). See supra notes 11011, 125 and accompanying text.
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while the LLC entity is relatively new, human behavior has not changed.21
"Fundamental notions of fairness" call for courts to recognize and enforce
obligations inherent in fiduciary relationships when one's trust and confidence has been abused.'
There are a number of policy reasons supporting the enforcement of
fiduciary duties regardless of whether or not they are formally recognized in
a party's plain language agreement.21 2 Recognizing the inherent obligations
of fiduciaries encourages business growth because such enforcement provides security to investors: Investors are more apt to join a business when
they feel they can trust those involved. 23 Furthermore, it is unrealistic to
expect investors to contract for every possible scenario in lieu of enforcing
inherent default rules among fiduciaries. 4 Investors are generally optimistic in joining a new business venture and less likely to consider negative
scenarios."' Should they be aware of such concerns, investors may nonetheless not wish to negotiate exit strategies up front because doing so may jeopardize a business opportunity." 6 Requiring negotiation for protection from
abusive behavior is not only inefficient because it increases up-front transaction costs, but also favors the wealthy who are better able to hire an attorney
to customize and review their LLC agreement. 2 7 Requiring written recognition of fiduciary duties is also unfair to novice investors who are more apt to
be unfamiliar with what contractual provisions they would thereby need to
negotiate. 218 In sum, the recognition and enforcement of default rules inherent in fiduciary relationships is reflective of societal values: Duties owed
business entities and those affected by business decisions are emphasized
over one's pure self-interest."' Courts should not encourage business partners to look for loopholes in their contractual agreements which technically
allow them to disregard the effect of their actions on their business partner's
interests. 220

210. Miller, supra note 5, at 1612. It can easily be predicted that LLCs, like close corporations, after years of experience, will require special statutory protections from abusive and
opportunistic majority behavior. Miller, supra note 34, at 439.
211. Miller, supra note 5, at 1650.
212.

See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.

Moore, supra note 6, at 197.
Id.
Id; Karjala, supra note 114, at 477.
Moore, supra note 6, at 197.
217.
Id.; Karjala, supra note 114, at 477.
218. Miller, supra note 5, at 1620.
219. Id. at 1621.
220. See Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274, 284 (Wyo. 2004) (Lehman, C.J.,
dissenting). For example, Chief Justice Lehman noted,
213.
214.
215.
216.

While it could be said that this situation arose because of Lieberman's
withdrawal, it should be noted that under the majority's analysis the result
would apply equally to an expelled member. In such an instance, some of
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It is, thus, not surprising that some courts have already recognized a
fiduciary relationship as inherent between members, as interest holders, of
an LLC.2 ' While contractarians support the recent statutory trend of limiting broad interpretations of fiduciary duties as preventing spurious litigation,
Delaware, as a state with an LLC statute which provides little guidance other

than that the contractual obligation of good faith cannot be eliminated,
has actually seen a substantial rise in majority-minority lawsuits.122 It
is possible for Wyoming, like the Delaware court in Walker v. Resource Development Co. Ltd., L.L.C., to find at a minimum that the contractual obligation of good faith protects a minority LLC member subject to the opportunistic behavior of a squeeze-out. 23 Just as not having formally contracted for
what was to happen to a member's equity interest upon a member's withdrawal does not mean the parties agreed for nothing to happen to such an
equity interest, the fact that the members of Wyoming.com did not address
their fiduciary duties or inherent contractual obligations of good faith and
fair dealing in their written contracts does not mean they agreed to eliminate
or reduce their existence.2 4
Like a close corporation and a partnership, Wyoming.com had a
small number of interest holders who were also the members managing, directing, and operating the company, with no ready market existing for the
sale of their LLC interests.225 Started by Lieberman, Steven A. Mossbrook
the members could expel a member and then refuse to negotiate for a
buyout. Such a result begs for the oppression of one party. While I agree
with the majority that it is not our duty to write contract provisions for
parties that have failed to do so, I believe it would be much worse to fail
to provide a remedy.
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
221.
See Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209-11 (111. App. 2d. 2002) (recognizing when
fiduciary duties in an LLC were not explicitly established by statute, they nonetheless existed
as paralleling corporate director responsibilities due to the similar nature of LLC membermanager roles); McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1214 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999) (acknowledging fiduciary duties exist between LLC members as if they are partners in the court's focus on whether such duties could be limited in an operating agreement).
Miller, supra note 34, at 449; Miller, supra note 5, at 1617-20; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
222.
§ 18-1101 (2004). See supra notes 76-81, 94-96, 98-104 and accompanying text. In a recent
study, Delaware had more than twice as many of such lawsuits than other states reviewed.
Miller, supra note 5, at 1619-20. See generally Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC
Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 351 (2003).
223.
See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
224.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THoMpsoN, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE
225.
CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2 (Rev. 3d ed. 2004). See supra note 125
and accompanying text. Wyoming.com never consisted as an LLC of more than ten members
at one time, with never more than five natural persons. Amendment to the Articles of Organization of Wyoming.com LLC (Dec. 29, 1998) (on file with the Wyoming Secretary of
State); Amendment to the Articles of Organization of Wyoming.com LLC (Jan. 20, 1996) (on
file with the Wyoming Secretary of State); Amendment to the Articles of Organization of
Wyoming.corn LLC (Aug. 14, 1995) (on file with the Wyoming Secretary of State).
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and Sandra S. Mossbrook, Wyoming.corn provided a source of employment
for Lieberman as vice-president and Steven A. Mossbrook as president."' It
seems unlikely these three founding co-owners began their small business
expecting to have a purely contractual, arms-length relationship 22 7 Rather,
the fiduciary principles of a close corporation or partnership would be expected to apply to Lieberman and the Mossbrooks 2 s The duty of loyalty
between partners and shareholders of a close corporation would indicate
Lieberman was due the "utmost good faith and loyalty" from the Mossbrooks, and should be fairly compensated for his equity interest.2 29 Even if
corporate principles were applied to Lieberman's situation, corporate directors' duty to "deal openly and honestly" with one another in all transactions
and to avoid oppressive behavior as fiduciaries to the company's shareholders lead to the dissent's more equitable outcome.23 ° Furthermore, the Wyoming Business Corporation Act indicates directors and controlling officers
may consider the interests of employees and long-term interests of the
shareholders in determining what is in the best interest of the company.23
Lieberman was an interest holder and an employee of Wyoming.com to
whom Steven Mossbrook, as a manager under corporate law, would owe a
226. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, I I P.3d 353, 355 (Wyo. 2000); Wyoming.com
Operating Agreement 1 7.6 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Wyoming.com LLC); Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 7, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, I I P.3d 353 (Wyo.
2000) (No. 99-97).
227. Gelb, supra note 126, at 567. As described by Professor Gelb,
Take the typical situation in which three people enter a business together
as co-owners and co-workers. It is beyond the imagination to conceive of
them as plotting to use the employment-at-will doctrine against each
other. It is far more likely they expect and hope to have good, honest, and
fair relations with each other. Using an employment-at-will doctrine to
automatically trump the fiduciary claims of the co-owners of a business
seems thoroughly inappropriate. Similarly, readily interpreting contracts
of co-owners to embody intent by them to waive fairness and normal decency standards seems unrealistic at best.
Id. Additionally, by opting for the limited liability aspects of a corporation, Lieberman and
the Mossbrooks did not also indicate a desire to have the personal relationships of corporate
directors with no fiduciary duties to one another. See Gelb, supra note 126, at 569. As further explained by Professor Gelb,
In many situations, persons go or have gone into business together thinking like partners, but based on legal or accounting advice, choose a form
that is not a true partnership. They may opt for a corporate or other form
for tax or limited liability reasons, but not for differing perceptions on
power, ownership, or sharing in the fruits of the business.
Id.

228.
229.
230.

See supra notes I 10, 125 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209 (I1. App. 2d 2002).

231.

See supra note 102.
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fiduciary duty, if not, at a minimum, a good faith and fair dealing contractual
obligation.232
As an oppressed member in a situation likened to a "squeeze-out,"
the reality of Lieberman's situation after the Wyoming Supreme Court's
decision in Lieberman II is that while he was no longer receiving the income
of a salary as vice-president, he was expected to pay taxes on 40 percent of
the LLC's earnings, which are only theoretically, not actually, passedthrough to LLC equity interest holders under federal tax law.233 Hence, an
investment in a profitable business could become a liability, rather than an
asset, to a minority member who finds himself subject to oppressive behavior.'
This creates an incredibly inequitable outcome, as such a former
member not only loses his job but may become forced to sell his equity interest at a greatly reduced rate.235
Ramifications
Investor insecurity in the Wyoming LLC is likely to result from the
Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC.
Lawyers and LLC members are strongly advised to review their operating
agreements to ensure a gap regarding rights and obligations upon an LLC
member's withdrawal does not similarly exist in their contractual agreements. Whereas once uncertainty existed as to whether the state would follow partnership law, corporation law, or create a separate LLC standard in
interpreting the WLLCA, it is now understood the Wyoming Supreme Court
will take a strict, albeit none too conscientious, contractual approach in construing parties LLC agreements.236 Hence, the Wyoming State Legislature is
encouraged to enact an LLC statute similar to section 17-17-140 of the close
corporation supplement, which provides for a remedy upon the oppression of
a shareholder.237

232.
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 82 P.3d 274, 275-76 (Wyo. 2004). See supra
notes 102, 111 and accompanying text.
233.
Lieberman II, 82 P.3d at 284 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text. While Lieberman's withdrawal of his membership in Wyoming.com was
technically voluntary, it was a result of his termination as vice-president by the LLC majority
shareholder, Steven A. Mossbrook. Id.; Brief of Appellant E. Michael Lieberman at 6, Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-97). Mossbrook had police
remove Lieberman from the LLC's Riverton office as a trespasser. Brief of Appellant at 6,
Lieberman (No. 99-97). Lieberman was not included in subsequent LLC owners' meetings
wherein he was voted off as vice-president. Id.
234. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
235.

See supra note 118.

236.
See supra notes 180-235 and accompanying text.
237.
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-17-140 (LexisNexis 2004). This statute recognizes a fiduciary relationship between those in control of close corporations and close corporation shareholders:
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The holding in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC also encourages the
formation of limited liability partnerships ("LLP") over LLCs. 238 An LLP
follows the well-established default rules of partnership law including principles of fiduciary duties among partners.239 Since both LLPs and LLCs are
pass-through entities for federal taxation purposes, if the limited liability
aspects of a Wyoming LLP were found to be equal to that of a Wyoming
LLC, the Wyoming LLC could become obsolete.24 Savvy investors seeking
a more flexible business structure may take their "LLC business" to a state
which recognizes default fiduciary duties among LLC members rather than

[A] shareholder of a statutory close corporation may petition the district
court for any of the relief described in W.S. 17-17-141 through 17-17-143
if:
(i) The directors or those in control of the corporation have acted,
are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity
as shareholder, director or officer of the corporation.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-17-140 (Lexis 2004).
238. Lieberman I1,82 P.3d at 275-76. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
239. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-21-1102 (LexisNexis 2004) ("A partnership that has registered pursuant to this article is for all purposes of the laws of this state the same entity that
existed before the registration."). See also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
240. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-21-1102, 17-15-113 (LexisNexis 2004). Comparing Wyoming statute 17-21-306 to section 17-15-113 of the WLLCA, Wyoming statute 17-21-306
appears to have a more narrow scope of limited liability:
[A]II or specified partners of a registered limited liability partnership may
be liable in their capacity as partners for all or specified debts, obligations
or liabilities of a registered limited liability partnership to the extent at
least a majority of the partners shall have agreed unless otherwise provided in any agreement between the partners. Any such agreement may
be modified or revoked to the extent at least a majority of the partners
shall have agreed, unless otherwise provided in any agreement between
the partners, provided, however, that:
(i) Any such modification or revocation shall not affect the liability
of a partner for any debts, obligations or liabilities of a registered
limited liability partnership incurred, created or assumed by the registered limited liability partnership prior to the modification or revocation; and
(ii) A partner shall be liable for debts, obligations and liabilities of
the registered limited liability partnership incurred, created or assumed after such modification or revocation only in accordance with
this article and, if the agreement is further modified, the agreement
as so further modified but only to the extent not inconsistent with...
this section.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-21-306 (LexisNexis 2004). See supra note 44, for section 17-15-113 of
the WLLCA.
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risk an unknown outcome from a possible gap in their operating agreement.
This could lead to a heavy toll on Wyoming, as a state with little business
infrastructure which nonetheless generated $1.2 million in LLC license taxes
and almost half a million in LLC filing fees in fiscal year 2004 alone. 241
CONCLUSION

While the decision in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC recognizes
the modem view of the LLC as a flexible, contractual-based business entity,
the majority does not present a thorough analysis of the parties' contractual
agreement. 42 The long-standing fiduciary principles of partnership law are
inherent in non-public LLC member relationships because of their parallel
role as co-owners in a small business with no ready market available for
their interests. 3 Although fiduciary duties and the contractual obligations
of good faith and fair dealing were not specifically stated in Wyoming.com's
Operating Agreement or stipulated in the WLLCA, they remain an inherent
One
presence due to public policy concerns of fairness and efficiency."
should keep in mind "that the contractarian model can be reconciled with the
mandatory core of duties emerging in LLC case law by recognizing that at
the heart of the private contract is the notion that there is a legally enforceable bargain subject to the many mandatory constraints of the legal environment. 2 15 By limiting its analysis to the plain language of the parties'
written documents, which did not address Lieberman's situation, the majority ignored other valuable indicators of the parties' intent and understanding.246 As such,while the majority prided itself on the public policy interest
in the court's role as construing, not creating, contractual agreements, the
court created a situation neither Wyoming.com nor Lieberman was likely to
have agreed upon at the time of contract.24' Lieberman v. Wyoming.com
LLC serves as a strong warning to current members of LLCs and those looking to form an LLC in Wyoming.
CATHERINE M. ROGERS

241.
Interview with Jeanne Sawyer, Corporations Division Director, Wyoming Secretary
of State Office, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Oct. 4, 2004). In fiscal year 2004 domestic LLCs generated $770,997 and foreign LLCs generated $436,630 in license taxes, and LLC filing fees
generated $483,212 in state income. Id.
See supra notes 51-54, 180-202, 225-232.
242.
243.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
244.
See supra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
245.
Miller, supra note 5, at 1613.
246.
See supra notes 180-202, 225-32 and accompanying text.
247.
See supra notes 180-235 and accompanying text.
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